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Over half a century after the Nazi era, the U.S. Government continues
to keep secret much of the information it has on Nazi war criminals.It is
imperative that this information receivefull scrutiny by the public. Only
through an informed understanding of the Nazi era and its aftermath
can we guard against a repeat of one of the darkest moments in
history.'
Rep. Stephen Horn, July 1998
I. INTRODUCTION

The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 required the U.S.
Government to expedite the release of classified intelligence
information related to German war crimes committed during World War
II.2 In an effort to fulfill this mandate, an interagency working group
was called upon to "locate, identify, recommend for declassification,
and make available to the public at the National Archives and Records
Administration, all classified Nazi war criminal records of the United
States."3 This working group would ultimately release over 8.5 million
pages from documents "scattered among the vast quantities of files
stored in the national archives and individual federal agencies." As a
result, this project would come to be regarded as the "largest
congressionally mandated declassification effort in history."5 Although
members of Congress were successful in initiating an unprecedented
release of information, 6 their efforts are notable for another reason as
well-America's lawmakers failed to allocate funds for the continued
research and preservation of this material.7 Rather, they left this
substantial responsibility to inquisitive historians and members of the
1. Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: Hearing on H.R. 4007 and S. 1379 Before the
Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt., Info., and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight,
105th Cong. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Hearing] (Statement of Rep. Stephen Horn, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt., Info., and Tech.).
2. Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 105-246, 112 Stat. 1859 (1998)
(codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 522 note).
3. Id. at § 1(c)(1). See also Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group,
Implementation ofNazi War Crimes DisclosureAct: An Interim Report to Congress (1999).
4. Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working
Group, FinalReport to Congress, at 1, 5 (2007) [hereinafter FinalReport].
5. Id. at 1.
6. See generally Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (describing congressional intent behind the
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998).
7. Implementation of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt., Info., and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight,
106th Cong. 8 (2000) (Statement of Dr. Michael Kurtz, Assistant Archivist of the United States,
Nat'l Archives and Records Admin.).
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general public. 8
Scholars have acknowledged that the study of World War II era
intelligence can be an extremely arduous undertaking.9 Intelligence
tradecraft, by its very nature, requires that certain information remain
secret.10 It necessitates the sustained concealment of activities and
events." Moreover, this government emphasis on secrecy often results
in the suppression of sensitive information from historians and citizens
alike. 12 Thus, it has "become a tradition in intelligence scholarship to
look to the declassified records of the past for enlightenment."' 3 This
trend has led multiple historians to conclude that "there are remarkable
fragments of the story which have lain undiscovered in improbable
places for more than fifty years."' 4 Consequently, those choosing to
carry out archival research "will undoubtedly find their own discoveries
in these declassified documents and in related records of the National
Archives."' 5
This Article should be regarded as a spirited departure from
traditional legal scholarship. It endeavors to be a "largely empirical
contribution to the start of a wider project"' 6 -namely, one that
examines fragments of declassified intelligence and attempts to place
this information into a larger mosaic of historical events." The
following discussion utilizes the case study method to communicate a
powerful message related to both law and history. Readers are
encouraged to examine this narrative and related analysis in conjunction
8. See id. at 15; see also Final Report, supra note 4, at 1, 2 (clarifying that agency
participants did not receive independent funding for the prolonged study of these documentsrather, their mandate was to release these records to the general public).
9. RICHARD BREITMAN ET AL., U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE NAzIS 8 (2005); RICHARD
ALDRICH, THE HIDDEN HAND: BRITAIN, AMERICAN, AND COLD WAR SECRET INTELLIGENCE 16

(2001).
10. MARK LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 1 (2009); John Radsan,

The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595, 599602 (2007).
11. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 10, at 1.
12. See id. (explaining that secrecy can be a source of consternation to private citizens,
especially in a democratic society such as the United States).
13. Lorie Charlesworth, 2 SAS Regiment, War Crimes Investigations, and British
Intelligence: Intelligence Officials and the Natzweiler Trial, 6 J. INTELLIGENCE HiST. 21 (2006)
[hereinafter Charlesworth, 2 SAS Regiment].
14. ALDRICH, supra note 9, at 15. See also BREITMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 8; MICHAEL
SALTER, NAzI WAR CRIMES, U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND SELECTIVE PROSECUTION AT NUREMBERG:
CONTROVERSIES REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 2, 3 (2007).
15. BREITMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 8.
16. SALTER, supra note 14, at 4.

17. ALDRICH, supra note 9, at 15, 16; SALTER, supra note 14, at 5 (discussing the inherent
difficulty in researching events that are recorded in documents scattered across various archival

collections); Charlesworth, 2 SAS Regiment, supra note 13, at 21 (comparing the study of
declassified intelligence to assembling a larger mosaic of historical information).
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with the primary source material it references. More importantly, they
are asked to evaluate relevant provisions of international law and to
apply these principles to a specific declassified report. It is through a
similar process that this Article arrives at its central conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
There is little doubt that memory is an essential concept for historians. In their search for "the 'truth' of remembered account," scholars
often turn to the case study method to "record and value" historical
events. 19 In his recent work related to postwar intelligence, Michael
Salter emphasizes the importance of the case study in placing declassified intelligence into its broader historical context. 20 Specifically, he
suggests that "detailed case studies can be as revealing of wider
historical and institutional tendencies as apparently broader sociological
approaches that seek to capture and generalize about the entire field."2 '
As Salter's viewpoints have gained acceptance amongst prominent
academic circles, a new legal sub-discipline has started to emerge.
Socio-legal analysis is described as a "fluid, changing, open
movement [that] defies a fixed descriptor." 22 At its core, however, this
approach focuses on the intersection of law, intelligence, and human
rights.2 3 Proponents of this movement stress that it explores historical
events "from the perspective of the various participants, emphasizing
their 'lived experience."' 24 As a result, some scholars have asserted that
this legal sub-discipline "encourages the voice of the historian to be
heard directly in the text," thereby making remembered account an
18. Lorie Charlesworth, ForgottenJustice: ForgettingLaw's History and Victim's Justice
in British "Minor" War Crimes Trials 1945-48, at 74 Amicus Curiae 2 (2008) [hereinafter
Charlesworth, ForgottenJustice].
19. See id. at 4.
20. See SALTER, supra note 14, at 3. See also Michael Salter, Intelligence Agencies and
War Crimes Prosecution: Allen Dulles's Involvement in Witness Testimony at Nuremberg, 2 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 826 (2004) (describing CIA Director Allen Dulles's involvement in the

Nuremberg proceedings); Michael Salter, Trial by Media: The Psychological Warfare
Background to OSS's Contribution to the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, 9 J. INTELLIGENCE
HIST. 15 (2010) (analyzing the role of the Office of Strategic Services in the Nuremberg
proceedings); Ian Bryan & Michael Salter, War Crimes Prosecutorsand Intelligence Agencies:
The Case for Assessing their Collaboration, 16 INTELLIGENCE & NAT'L SECURITY 93 (2001)
(providing additional discussion of the involvement of intelligence agencies in monitoring war
criminality).
21.

SALTER, supra note 14, at 3.

22. Charlesworth, Forgotten Justice,supra note 18, at 3.
23. See id. (referencing socio-legal studies in the context of Salter's emphasis on
intelligence studies and humanitarian scholarship).
24. Id.
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integral piece of the ensuing narrative. Thus, readers should be aware
that throughout the remainder of this Article, "the authorial voice, my
voice, disrupts [this] narrative . . . to allow other interpretations to

emerge and to sabotage illusions of closure." 26 This was done
deliberately and in an effort to familiarize the audience with the case
study that follows.
In the summer of 2011, through hard work and a bit of luck, my
father and I were able to learn more about the man who made our very
existence possible, Lt. Raymond Murphy. The task of locating my
grandfather was complicated by a number of factors, not the least of
which was his misrepresenting his age by one year to join the U.S.
Army Air Corps in 1942. In addition, my father never met his birth
father and knew few particulars of the man's life. Although my
grandfather passed away in 1970 at the age of forty-six, we were
fortunate to discover a series of documents detailing his experiences
during World War II.27 Moreover, our journey led us to his final resting
place at Arlington National Cemetery.
Although the details that led to this discovery are certainly
noteworthy, this Article seeks to examine something much more
significant-the story my grandfather was able to share with us nearly
forty years after his death. On April 28, 1944, Lt. Murphy was shot
down by German anti-aircraft fire over Avord, France on his sixteenth
mission as a B-17 Navigator with the 91st Bomb Group, 324th
Squadron.28 For the next three months, he successfully evaded German
patrols and Nazi collaborators with the help of local French Resistance
fighters known as le Maquis.29
Following his escape in August of 1944, my grandfather was
questioned by the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Service at
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id.
27. The information in this Article is primarily drawn from Missing Air Crew Report
(MACR) No. 4235 and Escape and Evasion Report (E&E) No. 866. During World War II, U.S.
Army Air Corps Bomb Groups were required to submit MACRs when airmen were lost during
combat operations. E&E Reports were required when personnel subsequently avoided capture
by enemy forces. Notably, the National Archives and Records Administration recently made
E&E reports publicly available in electronic format. Thus, the primary source material contained
in MACR No. 4235 and E&E No. 866 should be examined in conjunction with this Article.
Please see relevant citations and associated hyperlinks to access publicly available versions of
these documents.
28. See generally Escape and EvasionReport No. 866, Evasion in France(Aug. 15, 1944)
[hereinafter
E&E No.
866],
available at http://media.nara.gov/nw/305270/EE866.pdf?bcsi_scanOF6519961A 220080=0&bcsiscanfilename=EE-866.pdf.
29. Id. See also JULiAN JACKSON, FRANCE: THE DARK YEARS 1940-1944 (2001); CLAUDE
CHAMBARD, THE MAQUIS: A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (1976)

(providing a more thorough discussion of French Resistance efforts and the structure of le
Maquis generally).
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Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. 30 The information he
provided during his debriefing was recorded in narrative form and
analyzed for intelligence related to the continued presence of German
forces in occupied France. At the conclusion of his interview, my
grandfather signed a security certificate forbidding him from disclosing
any facts related to his wartime experience. 3 1 The resulting report was
marked "SECRET" and titled Escape and Evasion Report No. 866,
Evasion in France.32 Only recently has this document been made
available to the public in electronic format.33
Although my father and I will never be able to sit down with Lt.
Murphy and discuss his story, his words are compelling even forty years
after his death. As a scholar of intelligence law and history, I was struck
by the significance of his experiences in the summer of 1944. When
examined from a legal perspective, his declassified first-person account
is illustrative of a number of law of war topics, including the law related
to land and aerial warfare, escape and evasion, and the duties owed to
inhabitants during belligerent occupation. Most notably, however, my
grandfather's report also evidences criminal atrocities committed by
German soldiers.
The story told by Lt. Murphy is one of great valor and sacrifice.
Accordingly, this Article will attempt to honor his memory while also
providing a thorough legal analysis of the conduct that he witnessed.
The following discussion will examine his experiences in the context of
the law of war as it existed in 1944. It will also provide a modem
perspective of how this body of law has evolved since World War II. In
addition, this Article will examine a particularly disturbing recollection
reported by my grandfather to military intelligence officers and attempt
to answer one important question-could the terrible event described in
Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 constitute evidence of a longforgotten war crime? 34
30. See E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 1. See, e.g., Charlesworth, 2 SAS Regiment, supra
note 13, at 13 (demonstrating that intelligence collection played a critical role in post-War
proceedings such as the Nuremberg Trials and other minor war crimes trials).
31. E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 21.
32. Id. According to the National Archives, E&E Reports were developed to collect and
evaluate data on escape and evasion activities in the European Theater of Operations. They
included a brief questionnaire as well as a typed or handwritten narrative provided by the
escapee or evader. Notably, these reports were not intended to collect information on war crimes
or other criminal acts perpetrated by enemy forces.
33. National Archives, NARAtions: The Blog of the United States National Archives,
World War II Escape and Evasion Reports Are Now Available Online (Sept. 14, 2010),
http://blogs.archives.gov/online-public-access/?p=2751 (stating that digitized versions of Escape
and Evasion Reports first became available on NARA's website in September 2010); see also
National Archives, Prologue: Pieces of History, http://blogs.archives.gov/prologue/?p= 1798.
34. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 50, 320 (2008);
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III. THE LAW OF WAR IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In order to analyze Lt. Murphy's account, it is first necessary to
provide some context to the war as it existed in the skies over Europe
during this period. The experiences of my grandfather and the crew of
his B-17 were in no way unique or exceptional. Rather, all airmen in the
U.S. Eighth Air Force, or the Mighty Eighth as it was often referred to,
took part in fierce aerial combat in the period leading up to the summer
of 1944.35 One aircrew in particular, the crew of the Memphis Belle,
made my grandfather's squadron famous when they were the first to
successfully complete twenty-five missions and return to America as
celebrated heroes. 6
The air war had raged in Europe "for two years by the time elements
of the Eighth Air Force began to arrive in late 1942 and deploy across
the misty English countryside." 3 7 As the conflict wound on, the air war
"kept on creating and re-creating itself in a furious upward curve,
attackers and defenders alike improvising tactics on a round-the-clock
basis, ransacking science and engineering for new technology, any kind
of edge - new bomber specs and new fighter-plane wrinkles . . . ever-

higher ranges in antiaircraft fire." 38 In addition, the Eighth Air Force's
mission in Europe was made all the more deadly by one major factordaytime bombing missions.39
The American forces had committed themselves to daylight
bombing, against the advice of their British counterparts, who
considered it suicidal and had long since switched to nighttime
bombing. The Eighth still held to the theory that a tight formation
or a combat box, of B-17 Flying Fortresses, each bristling with
SALTER, supra note 14, at 6 (illustrating that under Article 6 of the London Charter of 1945, the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was given jurisdiction over crimes against peace,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity-although crimes against peace and humanity had
never been previously defined under international law, these terms were given broad application
under these proceedings).
35.

ROGER FREEMAN,

THE MIGHTY EIGHTH: A HISTORY OF THE UNITS,

MEN AND

MACHINES OF THE US 8TH AIR FORCE (1970); MARION HAVELAAR, THE 91ST BOMBARDMENT

GROUP IN WORLD WAR 11 (1995). See also ROB MORRIS, UNTOLD VALOR: FORGOTTEN STORIES
OF AMERICAN BOMBER CREWS OVER EUROPE IN WORLD WAR 11 (2006) (detailing personal

accounts of airmen from the 8th Air Force during World War II).
36.

RoN POWERS & ROBERT MORGAN, THE MAN WHO FLEW THE MEMPHIS BELLE:

MEMOIR OF A WWII BOMBER PILOT (2001).

37. Id. at 102. See also HAVELAAR, supra note 35, at 9 (describing the arrival and
deployment of the 8th Air Force in 1942).
38. POWERS & MORGAN, supra note 36, at 102.
39. See JOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 425-26 (1989); see also DAVID METS,
THE AIR CAMPAIGN:

JOHN WARDEN AND THE CLASSICAL AIRPOWER THEORISTS 28 (1999)

(describing daylight bombing and the theoretical underpinnings for this wartime practice).
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guns, was capable of defending itself from enemy fighter aircraft.
And the Eighth was finding that this was a mistake.4
The losses suffered by the Eighth Air Force were staggering. During
the European Campaign, more than 30,000 U.S airmen were killed or
missing and another 30,000 were captured as prisoners of war.4 1
Overall, the Eighth Air Force "took more casualties in World War II
than the Marine Corps and the Navy combined." 42 Of the 36 bombers
that had originally crossed the Atlantic to form the 91st Bomb Group,
"twenty-nine had been shot down, a casualty rate of 82 percent.'" 3
As a result of the alarming rate of casualties, many survivors were
troubled by the memories of friends and acquaintances who, ust the day
before, had been drinking next to them in a pub in England. Although
some men chose to talk openly about their experiences, others suffered
in silence.4 5 All airmen, however, speculated about what happened to
those who were able to escape their crippled aircraft and survive their
rapid descent to German occupied territory.4 6 Robert Morgan, the pilot
of the Memphis Belle, reflected on these men when he wrote:
[w]e knew every time we went up, that it was very possible,
likely even, to get hit hard, maybe knocked out of the sky. We
might get trapped and roasted at our stations, or riddled with flak
or machine gun bullets, or captured and sent to prison camps if
we bailed out, provided we survived the trip down.4 7
From 25,000 feet, the conflict below may have seemed somewhat
impersonal or distant at times. When an airman found himself in the
unfortunate situation of being shot down, however, the deadly reality of

40. MORRIS, supra note 35, at 54.
41.

POWERS & MORGAN, supra note 36, at 106. See also FREEMAN, supra note 35;

HAVELAAR, supra note 35 (providing more specific casualty reporting for the 8th Air Force and
91st Bomb Group).
42. POWERS & MORGAN, supra note 36, at 106.
43. Id. at 132.
44. See id. at 132-33; see also TRAVIs AYRES, THE BOMBER Boys: HEROES WHO FLEW
THE B-17s IN WORLD WAR 11 (2005); BERT STILES, SERENADE TO THE BIG BIRD 69 (2001)

(detailing personal accounts of airmen who served in World War II).
45. See POWERS & MORGAN, supra note 36, at 133.
46. See KAY SLOAN, NOT WITHOUT HONOR: THE NAZI JOURNAL OF STEVE CARANO 129

(2008) (providing Bill Blackmon's personal account of the events of April 28, 1944-notably,
Blackmon spent months in German captivity after his B- 17 was shot down during the bombing
run on Avord, France); see also STUART HADAWAY, MISSING BELIEVED KILLED: CASUALTY
POLICY AND THE MISSING RESEARCH AND ENQUIRY SERVICE 1939-1952 (2008) (describing the
search for missing Allied airmen in Europe).

47. POWERS & MORGAN, supra note 36, at 165.
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the situation quickly became apparent. Rather than returning to base to
enjoy a hot meal and shower, men like Lt. Murphy and his crew
members were forced to come face to face with the ground truth of land
warfare.
In 1944, the law of land warfare was primarily regulated by the 1907
Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land (Hague IV). 49 The precursor to Hague IV was the 1899 Hague
Convention II (Hague II).5o Although Hague II represented the "first
successful effort of the international community to codify a relatively
comprehensive regime governing the laws of land warfare," 5 ' the treaty
provisions agreed upon by the parties to Hague IV are still in force
today.52
Parties to both Hague II and Hague IV laid the foundation for what
would become known as jus in bello, or "the laws and customs of
war." 53 Notably, the Preamble to Hague IV also gave expression to
certain "high ideals" which formed the basis for modern humanitarian
law.54 The Preamble reads in part:
[a]nimated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme case, the
interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs of
civilization; [t]hinking it important, with this object, to revise the
general laws and customs of war. .. the high contracting Parties
deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included by the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the
law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of

48. SLOAN, supra note 46, at 136. See also THOMAS CHILDERS, IN THE SHADOWS OF WAR:
AN

AMERICAN PILOT'S ODYSSEY

THROUGH OCCUPIED FRANCE AND THE CAMPS OF NAzI

GERMANY (2002).

49. See Michael Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in InternationalHumanitarian
Law: Preservingthe Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT'L. L. 795, 800, 806 (2010); Chris Jochnick
& Roger Normand, The Legitimization of Violence: A CriticalHistory of the Laws of War, 35
HARV. J. INT'L L. 49, 52 (1994).
50. See ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENT ON THE LAWS OF WAR 67, 68
(2000). See also KEVIN CHAMBERLAIN, WAR AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 9 (2004).

51. GREEN, supra note 34, at 41.
52. FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 23 (3d ed. 2001).

53. GREEN, supra note 34, at 22. See also Robert Sloane, The Cost of Conflation:
Preservingthe Dualism ofJus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34
YALE J. INT'L L. 47, 49 (2009); Carsten Stahn, 'Jus ad bellum, ]us in bello' . . . 'us post
bellum'? - Rethinking the Conception of Law of Armed Force, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 921, 925
(2006).
54. GREEN, supra note 34, at 22, 23.
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the public conscience.5 5
This section of Hague IV, which would come to be known as the
Martens Clause, makes a clear distinction between the "laws" versus the
"customs" of war. 56 Thus, while Hague IV represented a "relatively
comprehensive agreement on the law of land warfare,"5 7 its provisions
were not intended to be inclusive of all applicable law. Rather, the
Martens Clause proscribes that "cases not included in the Regulations
annexed to the Convention remain governed by customary international
law relating to the conduct of warfare." 58 Consequently, this principle
would be resoundingly reaffirmed in the 1949 Geneva Convention III
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners (GPW), the 1949 Geneva
Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times
of War (GC IV), and the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I).59
The "Geneva Law," as this postwar collective is sometimes referred
to, dictates that the principles of humanitarian law are applicable to any
conflict, even if a nation has clearly denounced the Conventions.
Thus, Hague IV, which regulated land warfare during World War II,
contained many of the fundamental precepts for modern international
agreements.61 In effect, the Geneva Law "complemented and
supplemented" these already existing legal norms. 62 German officials,
however, had a much different interpretation of the duties owed under
Hague IV in the build-up to World War II.63 Although Germany signed
and ratified the annexed Regulations, they maintained a specific
55. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), pmbl.,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631, 632-33 (1968) [hereinafter Hague IV].
56. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 68. See also Thedor Meron, The Martens
Clause, Principlesof Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 79
(2000); William Downey, The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 251
(1953).
57. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 68. See also Schmitt, supra note 49, at 797.
58, ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 68.
59. Id. See also Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict,
317 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 125-34 (1997).
60. See KALSHOVEN & ZIEGVELD, supra note 52, at 53-54; see also GREEN, supra note 34,

at 23.
61. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 68. See also Schmitt, supra note 49, at 807-11

(explaining the evolution of the law of war).
62. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 68.
63. See THE WAR BOOK OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF (J.H. Morgan trans., McBride,
Nast & Co. 1915) [hereinafter WAR BOOK], available at http://books.google.com/books?id=

j3kDAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs-ge_summary_r&cad=0#v-onepage&q&f
=false (providing a pre-World War II translation of the German War Manual). See also James
Garner, The German War Code, 15 U. ILL. BULL.

1, 9-10, 20 (1918)

(containing a

complimentary analysis of the doctrine of Kriegsraisonand its relation to Hague IV).
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reservation to Article 44.64
Germany's reservation to Hague IV should have served as a
forewarning of events to come. Specifically, Article 44 states that a
"[b]elligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory occupied
by it to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or
about its means of self-defense." 6 5 Thus, Germany's reservation to
Hague IV could be viewed as evidence of the country's intention to not
only invade neighboring territory, but also gather information on a
country's military defenses by forcing local inhabitants into
collaboration.66 These facts become even more troubling when coupled
with the doctrine of Kriegsraisongeht vor Kriegsrecht, or as it is more
commonly referred to, Kriegsraison.67
Kriegsraisonis a concept that first appeared in German literature in
the late 18th century.6 8 The literal translation of this term is "military
necessity in war overrides the law of war."6 9 Accordingly, German
proponents of the doctrine believed that "military necessity . . . renders

inoperative ordinary law and the customs and usages of war." 70
Interestingly, this belief starkly contrasts with the contemporary law of
war framework which recognizes that "[n]ecessity cannot overrule the
64. See ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 84. Germany signed the annexed

Regulations of Hague IV on October 18, 1907 and subsequently ratified these provisions on
November 27, 1909. Id. at 83, 84. At the time of signature they made note of their specific
reservation and maintained this reservation until ratification, as did Austria-Hungary, Japan,
Montenegro, and Russia. Id.
65. Hague IV, supra note 55, at 651.
66. See Gamer, supra note 63, at 10, 20.
67. Scott Horton, Kriegsraison or Military Necessity? The Bush Administration's
Wilhelmine Attitude Towards the Conduct of War, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 576, 585-87. For a
more detailed discussion of the doctrine, see also GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 266 (2010). Solis writes that "Kriegsmanier

was the conduct of war according to the customs and laws of war; Kriegsraison, its opposite,
was the non-observation of those customs and laws." Id. He further asserts that while
Kriegsraison was embraced by some German politicians and military officers, "it is probable
that the resort to this doctrine was above all based on contempt for the law." Id.
68. SOLIS, supra note 67, at 266. See also Gamer, supra note 63, at 11.
69. SOLIS, supra note 67, at 265. See also WAR BOOK, supra note 63, at 68. Notably, this
German manual on land warfare states that:
A war conducted without energy cannot be directed merely against the
combatants of the Enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it will and
must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual and material resources
of the latter. Humanitarian claims such as the protection of men and their goods
can only be taken into consideration in so far as the nature and object of the war
permit.
70. SOLIS, supra note 67, at 266 (citing Louis Doswald Beck, InternationalHumanitarian
Law and the Advisory Opinion of the InternationalCourt ofJustice on the Legality or Threat or
Use ofNuclear Weapons, 316 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 33 (1997)).
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law of war."7 1 In fact, modem U.S. Army doctrine explains that
"[m]ilitary necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts
forbidden by the customary and conventional laws of war."72 Of
particular note, relevant law and custom are binding "not only upon
states . . . but also upon individuals, and in particular, the members of
their armed forces."7
Although Kriegsraison was overwhelmingly repudiated by the
international community in the years following World War I, the facts
and circumstances in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 strongly
suggest that this doctrine was thriving amongst German forces in wartorn France.7 4 While Kriegsraisonallows a belligerent to violate rules of
international law it deems "necessary for the success of its military
operations,"7
the underlying reasoning for this viewpoint is
fundamentally flawed.7 6 As German forces in World War II were the
sole judge of what constituted military necessity, the "doctrine [was]
really that a belligerent may violate the law or repudiate it or ignore it
whenever [it was] deemed to be for its military advantage." Thus,
Kriegsraison had no basis in fundamental principles of international
law, but rather relied on a practitioner's self-serving motivations and an
innate "contempt" for the established law of war.78
IV. THE FIRST TO LEAVE THE SHIP
At 1154 hours on April 28, 1944, two airmen in accompanying B17s observed m' grandfather's aircraft leave formation with its "No. 3
engine on fire." 9 The weather conditions for the mission over Avord,
France were relatively clear with only "slight ground haze . . . [and]

scattered clouds."80 Although this enabled the heavy bombers a great
71. Id. at 265.
72. Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual 27-10, Appendix
A-I (July 1956) [hereinafter The Law ofLand Warfare]. See also JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 164-65 (2005).

73. The Law ofLand Warfare, supra note 72.
74. See Downey, supra note 56, at 253 (discussing the doctrine of Kriegsraison and its
application in World War II); see also Norman Dunbar, Military Necessity in War Crimes
Trials, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 441, 446-67 (1952).
75. Sous, supra note 67, at 267.
76. Horton, supra note 67, at 586; see also Schmitt, supra note 49, at 797-99.
77.

SOLIS, supra note 67, at 267 (citing CLAUD MULLINS, THE LIEPZIG TRIALS: AN

ACCOUNT OF THE WAR CRIMINALS' TRIALS AND A STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY 123 (1921)).

78. Id.; see also Jochnick & Normand, supra note 49, at 63-64.
79. See Missing Air Crew Report (MACR) No. 4235 (May 2, 1944) [hereinafter MACR

No. 42351, availableat http://heroesoffreedom.nl/42-97199.pdf, see also HAVELAAR, supra note
35, at 118.
80. MACR No. 4235, supra note 79, at 2.
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deal of visibility over their target, it also allowed German forces below
to more effectively direct their anti-aircraft fire during this dangerous
daytime mission. The first witness to the incident remembered seeing
nine parachutes before his vision was obstructed by other planes in the
formation. 1 The second witness saw all ten airmen bail out of the
crippled aircraft before it exploded in midair. 82
My grandfather reported that his B-17 was "in pretty bad shape"
after receiving a direct hit immediately over its target. 83 He had been
wounded in both hands by exploding flak and observed a substantial
amount of "fire on [the] win." 8 4 The gas tank between the No. 3 and
No. 4 engine was in flames, which left the crew with little time to
escape. My grandfather "was the first to leave the ship" and jumped
from an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet. 86 He dela 'ed opening his
parachute to avoid German flak and machine gun fire. 8 Unfortunately,
he waited too long and the resulting impact knocked him unconscious
and fractured his back. Shortly thereafter, local Frenchmen picked him
up and carried him into the woods where they gave him some "wine and
a woodman's jacket" and "helped [him] the best they could."
Although the pilot, Lt. James Cater, also escaped the crippled B-17,
his exit from the nose hatch at 15,000 feet was less than ideal.90 He
jumped with his hand on the rip cord, and accidently released his
parachute while he was "still in the prop wash."9 1 In all, Lt. Cater hung
from his parachute harness, exposed to exploding flak, for nearly
eighteen minutes. 92 During the final stage of his descent, he observed
German "machine gun fire from the ground, directed at [him] and the
other men." 93 Although he landed unharmed, he reported that other
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 3.
Id.
E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 12.
Id.

85. Id. See also HAVELAAR, supra note 35, at 188.

86. E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 1.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See generally Escape and Evasion Report No. 827, Evasion in France(July 14, 1944)
[hereinafter E&E No. 827], available at http://media.nara.gov/nw/305270/EE-827.pdf?bcsi_
scan_0F6519961 A220080=0&bcsiscan filename=EE-827.pdf. Lt. James Cater also survived
the destruction of my grandfather's aircraft over Avord, France. Id. His personal account is
recorded in E&E No. 827, dated July 1944. Thus, his rescue preceded that of my grandfather by
approximately one month. Although these two men did not act in concert to escape German
occupied France, they were both able to evade German forces by working in close coordination
with le Maquis. Id.
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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downed airmen were not so lucky. Lt. Cater recounted that "[t]wo men
were said to be shot by German machine gun fire" while trapped in their

harnesses. 94
When interviewed by military intelligence officers after his escape,
my grandfather was unsure of the fate of his fellow crewmembers. 9 5 He
reported seeing seven parachutes open during his rapid descent, and
remarked that the bombardier was exiting the aircraft "at the moment"
the plane exploded.9 6 When asked during his debriefing, "[w]hat is [the]
source's opinion as to the fate of the other crew members," my
grandfather's answer revealed the hopelessness he must have felt. 97 Lt.
Murphy responded matter-of-factly that all men were "believed to be
prisoners or dead - no one [else] contacted the resistance." 98
While my grandfather's predicament must have seemed quite
desperate, he was fortunate to have survived such a harrowing
experience. As he rightfully noted, he had not been killed during his
escape nor had he been captured as a prisoner of war. Most importantly,
the delayed release of his parachute had saved him from the
indiscriminate machine gun fire directed at his crew while they hung
defenseless from their parachutes. While such conduct on the part of
German forces certainly seems less than chivalrous, it is also notable for
another reason. It evidences a clear disregard for the laws and customs
of war.
As a matter of course, "the belligerents in both World Wars accepted
the 1907 [Hague] Conventions as governing their activities." 99 Although
Hague IV provides limited guidance related to the targeting of
defenseless airmen, it is notable that the annexed Regulations make
reference to the use of "balloons" and "appliances in the air" during
times of war.100 Thus, while Hague IV's provisions were intended to
apply to land warfare rather than aerial warfare, one could infer that it is
often quite difficult to ascertain where one type of conflict ends and the
other begins. This distinction is especially complicated when discussing
the duty owed to those who have successfully parachuted to the earth
after their aircraft has been destroyed.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 10.
E&E No. 866, supranote 28, at 12.
Id.
Id.

98.

Id. See also CLAUDE GRIMAUD, ILS ETAIENT Dix-SEPT MAI-JUIN 1944, at 56-64

(2011). Although Lt. Murphy did not encounter any of his crewmembers in occupied France, he
was mistaken when he asserted that "no one [else] contacted the resistance." E&E No. 866,
supra note 28, at 12. Four other airmen found shelter with le Maquis including James Cater,
Clement Dowler, Regis Carney, and Herbert Campbell. GRIMAUD, supra, at 56. Their story was
recently recounted by French historian Claude Grimaud. Id.
99. GREEN, supra note 34, at 44. See also Jochnick & Normand, supranote 49, at 52.
100. Hague IV, supranote 55, arts. 29 & 53.
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While Hague IV contains guidelines related to the treatment and care
of prisoners of war,101 my grandfather's situation was not directly
analogous to that of a captured prisoner. Rather, he was a combatant
who had successfully escaped his stricken aircraft and had not yet been
given the opportunity to surrender. He was admittedly unarmed and was
effectively incapacitated at the time of his landing. 2 Despite the fact
that Germany maintained a reservation to Article 44 of the annexed
Regulations, they were bound by all other duties imposed by Hague IV
when dealing with U.S. airmen.103 In particular, Article 23 imposes a
specific prohibition on killing or wounding an enemy "who, having laid
down his arms, or having no longer means of defence [sic], has
surrendered at [his] discretion."' 04
In addition, German soldiers were constrained by the rules of
customary international law articulated in the 1923 Hague Rules of
Aerial Warfare. 0 5 Although these draft rules were never adopted as
legally binding, "they were regarded as an authoritative attempt to
clarify and formulate rules of air warfare, and largel corresponded to
[established] customary rules and general principles." 06 As evidence of
their applicability during World War II, "both Axis and Allied powers
proclaimed their adherence to the [Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare] and
made accusations of their violation."' 0 7 Specifically, Article 20
expressly forbids the type of misconduct witnessed by my grandfather
and his crew.1os It states, "[w]hen an aircraft has been disabled, the
occupants when endeavoring to escape by means of parachute must not
be attacked in the course of their descent."' 09
Under the modem law of war, there is still no "formally binding
agreement which exclusively addresses air warfare.""10 As if to
emphasize the importance of the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare,
however, a number of its principles are reiterated in modem provisions
of intemational law."' Notably, GPW formally recognizes the concept
101. See id. ch. II (containing provisions related to prisoners of war); see also Adam Klein
& Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARv. NAT'L
SEC. J. 85, 96 (2011); THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, LAW OF
WAR DESKTOP 74 (2011).

102. E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 1, 10.
103. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 84; Garner, supra note 63, at 7, 8.
104. Hague IV, supra note 55, art. 23.
105. See generally Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923); NATALINO RONZ1TTI & GABRIELLA
VENTUINI, THE LAW OF AIR WARFARE: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 43 (2006); RICHARD WYMAN,
THE FIRST RULES OF AERIAL WARFARE (1984).
106. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 139.

107. Id. at 140.
108. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 105, art. 20.

109. Id.
110. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 141.
111. RoNZITTI & VENTUINI, supra note 105, at 10, 21, 45, 96.
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of combatant immunityll2 which is further articulated in contemporary
U.S. jurisprudence.1 3 In recent times, combatant immunity has come to
signify "a doctrine rooted in the customary international law of war,
[which] forbids prosecution of soldiers for their lawful belligerent acts
committed durin4 the course of armed conflicts against legitimate
military targets."4
Furthermore AP I, which has not been adopted by the United States
but has come to represent persuasive customary international law," 5
provides unambiguous protections for escaping parachutists.
Specifically, AP I forbids the targeting of a "person parachuting from an
aircraft in distress" and further requires that a downed airman "be given
an opportunity to surrender before being made the object of attack.""' 6
Thus, it is "generally considered a rule of customary international law
that an aircrew baling [sic] out of a damaged aircraft are hors de combat
and immune from attack whether by enemy aircraft or from the
ground.""' 7 In addition, once an airman reaches the ground he shall not
be made the object of attack if "he has been rendered unconscious or is
otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is
incapable of defending himself."" 8
Thus, the conduct of German forces described by both my
grandfather and the pilot of his B-17 constituted violations of the laws
and customs of war. Despite the fact that Hague IV contained no
specific prohibition on the targeting of downed airmen descending from
their crippled aircraft, these actions were strictly forbidden by
established customary international law. In addition, it is unclear how
such behavior could be justified under the doctrines of Kriegsraisonor
military necessity. Certainly, killing unarmed and incapacitated airmen
112. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 87, 99
(Aug. 12, 1949) [hereinafter GPW].
113. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002). See also Geoffrey
Corn & Chris Jenks, Two Sides of the Combatant Coin: Untangling Direct Participationin
Hostilitiesfrom Belligerent Status in Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
313, 336 (2011); Major Alex Peterson, Order Out of Chaos: Domestic Enforcement of the Law
ofInternalArmed Conflict, 171 MIL. L. REv. 1, 19 (2002).
114. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 553.
115. GREEN, supra note 34, at 177; Michael Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't
of State, Remarks at the Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law
Conference on InternationalHumanitarianLaw: A Workshop on Customary InternationalLaw
and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
415, 419, 422-29 (1987). See also Michael Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participationin
Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 716-17 (2010).
116. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 42 (1977) [hereinafter AP I].
117. GREEN, supra note 34, at 177. See also THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL,
AIR FORCE OPERATIONS AND THE LAW 16, 25 (2009).

118. AP I, supra note 116, arts. 41(2)(c) & 42(1).
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is not indispensable for military success. Rather, it signifies a gross
repudiation of the laws of war and an overall contempt for the
humanitarian principles embodied in Hague IV.
V. SUCCESSFUL ESCAPE AND EVASION
While Lt. Murphy was certainly fortunate to have escaped the fate of
some of his fellow airmen at the hands of the Germans, his adventure
was far from over. For the next three months he would be forced to
evade capture by enemy soldiers and la Milice Frangaise,local French
militias loyal to occupying German forces."l 9 My grandfather had been
trained in escape and evasion in February of 1944 by an Intelligence
Officer in England and he found the lectures to be of significant
value.120 As revealed in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, he took
his duties very seriously. When asked about the destruction of "secret
papers and equipment," my grandfather responded in partially
capitalized letters, "I ATE them," as if to emphasize his resolve. 21
In order for my grandfather to escape detection by German soldiers,
it was necessary for him to blend in with the civilian population. He was
lucky that the Frenchmen who initially found him saw fit to place a
"woodman's jacket" over his shoulders.12 2 Although my grandfather
could barely walk because of the back injury he sustained during his
landing, the jacket provided a much needed disguise. 123 He remarked:
I started S by compass. Shortly after I started out, and while I was
talking to some Frenchmen, three truckloads of Germans drove
by, evidently searching for me. They paid no attention to me
while the Frenchmen said "Bonjour" to them ... [Subsequently] I
kept well off the roads and stayed in the woods as much as

possible.124
Throughout my grandfather's escape, German soldiers were in close
pursuit. He was told by resistance fighters that the "Germans formed a
119. See E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 5. See also HERBERT LOTTMAN, THE PURGE: THE
PURIFICATION OF FRENCH COLLABORATORS AFTER WORLD WAR 11 (1986). While le Maquis was
composed of rural French Resistance fighters, la Milice Frangaise was a paramilitary militia
loyal to the Vichy Regime. In his narrative, Lt. Murphy described how he was weary of not only
traditional German forces but also French collaborators. For periods up to a week in duration, he
was forced to sleep "in the woods carefully concealed, for the Milice were raising hell in the
section." E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 5.
120. E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 19.
121. Id. at 22.
122. Id. at 1.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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25
circle from Avord and followed him as far as [the town of] Blet."'1
This was a distance of nearly twenty kilometers. At one point, "they
were just three or four kilometers behind; one town they entered about
four hours after [he] had left it." 26 My grandfather, however, had
discovered a creative means of transportation in light of his injuries. He
observed that "[bicycling seemed to be quite safe as long as one
ducked for cars.'
Following the D-Day invasion of June 6, 1944, travel became
increasingly difficult.12 8 My grandfather noted that German military
operations were intensifying as a result of the Allied landing, and the
"Gestapo ran patrols on the main roads, using chiefly motor cars."l 29 I
addition, the Germans did away with all "through trains in France" and
transportation was limited to only those rail cars running east or
northeast towards the German border. 130 In the meantime, however, my
grandfather had been fortunate to come across a French family that put
him in direct contact with le Maquis.131
After contacting the French Resistance, Lt. Murphy was moved to
the farm of a local resistance leader, Monsieur Camille Gerbeau.1 32 At
this point in his journey, my grandfather seemed less concerned with
affecting his own escape and instead turned his attention towards
assisting the nearly 575 men training at this "center of resistance
activities."l 33 He was introduced to the grand chef de resistance, and
"participated in the parachuting [of resistance forcesi and in their radio
work, decoding messages as they instructed [him]."' 3
As a result of his actions, my grandfather was now acting in concert
with le Maquis and aiding their efforts as if he was a fellow resistance
fighter rather than a downed U.S. airman. He writes that he was
"sending out regular messages" 35 to Allied forces and was also relaying
information related to German "V-1" and "V-2" weapons.136 When he
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.

136.

Id. See also PETER COOKSLEY, FLYING BOMB: THE STORY OF HITLER'S V-WEAPONS IN

WORLD WAR II (1979); AYRES, supranote 44, at 216. See also RICHARD HOLMES, WORLD WAR
II: THE DEFINITIVE VISUAL HISTORY 278 (2009). The German V-Weapons, known as the V-1

flying bomb and the V-2 rocket, were pilotless, free-flight rockets developed for use against
England. HOLMES, supra, at 278. Notably, these weapons were largely indiscriminate and
inflicted substantial casualties on Allied civilians. Id.
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was finally rescued by the British Royal Air Force on August 5, 1944,
he was fully immersed in the culture of the resistance fighter. As
evidenced in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, my grandfather often
used the term "we" to describe the efforts of le Maquis against the
occupying German forces.' 37 Thus, on August 4, 1944, he recalls that
"we got our operational messages over the BBC . . . that night we went
to the meeting location], armed with MG's [machine guns] and psitols
[sic]."' 8
Finally, more than three months after his plane was shot down over
Avord, Lt. Murphy's long awaited salvation arrived.139 Although my
grandfather returned to England on August 6, 1944 after a daring Royal
Air Force rescue, 140 the danger he faced in occupied France is even
more significant when analyzed from a law of war perspective. Prior to
World War II, parties to a conflict presupposed that treaty obligations
applied only to international armed conflicts or conflicts between
states.14 1 Notably, Hague IV and its annexed Regulations refer
exclusively to "conflicts between nations." 4 2
As demonstrated by my grandfather's narrative, however, the
conflict in German occupied France was extremely complex.143 It had
both the characteristics of an inter-state and intra-state conflict.144 While
German soldiers were forced to defend against aerial bombardment
from traditional military forces stationed outside of German occupied
territory, internal resistance fighters such as le Maquis were actively
challenging German control from within.145
The multifaceted nature of this conflict allowed escaping combatants
to more easily blend in with sympathetic members of the local French
population in order to avoid capture.14 6 Although my grandfather
deliberately disguised himself in civilian clothing to avoid detection, his
interactions with le Maquis appear to go well beyond that of a typical
downed airman. As a result, he could no longer be considered as merely
an escaping combatant. Rather, his activities are more accurately
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GREEN, supra note 34, at 66.
Hague IV, supra note 55, pmbl.
See generallyE&E No. 866, supra note 28.

144. SYLVAIN ViTE, TYPOLOGY OF ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND ACTUAL SITUATIONS (2009); Roy Schondorfat, Extra-State Armed

Conflicts: Is There a Needfor a New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 1, 68 (2004);
Waldemar Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under
Domestic Law and TransnationalPractice,33 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 58-59 (1983).
145. See generally E&E No. 866, supra note 28.
146. Id. See also CHILDERS, supra note 48, at 173-98.
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described as being analogous to that of a spy or saboteur.147
The term "spy," as it is generally understood under Hague IV, refers
to a person who "collects information clandestinely behind enemy lines
while wearing civilian clothing." 48 Specifically, a person is considered
a spy when "he obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone
of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to
[a] hostile party."l 4 9 While my grandfather provided valuable assistance
to the French Resistance, such activities were likely conducted with
substantial risk to his well-being.
Hague IV makes a clear distinction between soldiers "carrying out
their missions openly" and those seeking to conceal their identities by
removing their uniforms. 50 In addition, the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial
Warfare requires members of the crew of a military aircraft to wear a
"distinctive emblem . . . should they become separated from their

aircraft."1 5 ' Generally, "[a]ny person who collects information while in
uniform retains his status as a combatant . . . and if captured is to be

treated as a prisoner of war."l 52 In contrast, spies and saboteurs do not
enjoy protected status when captured by enemy forces.' 53 Rather, they
may be tried and sentenced to death for their actions.1 54
In contemporary conflicts, AP I provides that, as a matter of
customary international law, "combatants are obliged to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an
attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack."' Therefore,
it would be contrary to the modem law of war for a combatant to
disguise himself as a civilian while openly taking part in hostilities. AP
I recognizes, however, "that there are situations in armed conflicts
where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Radsan, supra note 10, at 599-602.
GREEN, supra note 34, at 176 (citing Hague IV, supra note 55, art. 24).
Hague IV, supra note 55, art. 29.
Id.; Radsan, supra note 10, at 601-02.
Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 105, art. 15.

152. GREEN, supra note 34, at 176.

153. Id. at 145; Radsan, supra note 10, at 1277-78.
154. Hague IV, supra note 55, art. 30; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). In this
historic decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of a military tribunal that
sentenced eight German-born conspirators to death when they were captured entering the United
States during World War II for the purposes of espionage and sabotage. Id. at 48. These
individuals initially wore German military uniforms. Id. at 21. After penetrating inland,
however, they buried their uniforms and disguised themselves in civilian attire. Id. Notably,
Article 30 of Hague IV requires that "a spy taken in the act shall not be punished without
previous trial." Hague IV, supra note 55, art. 30. In fact, in modem conflicts it is widely
understood that to "punish [a spy] without a proper trial is a war crime." GREEN, supra note 34,
at 176.
155. AP I, supra note 116, art. 44(3).
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himself."' 5 6

so distinguish
All that is reqcuired in these instances is that
an individual "carr[y] his arms openly." 1 A combatant that is captured
by an enemy while refusing to comply with these provisions effectively
"forfeit[s] his right to be a prisoner of war."' 58
Therefore, under the law of war as it existed in 1944 and in modem
treaty provisions, it is highly advisable that "members of the armed
forces engaged in the collecting of information or sabotage in . . .
enemy-occupied territory should, whenever possible, wear [a]
uniform."' 5 To do otherwise would run the risk of being treated as a
spy if captured. Given the remainder of the discussion contained in this
Article, it seems likely that my grandfather would have been put to
death without the benefit of a trial had he been captured while assisting
le Maquis. In fact, Adolf Hitler had issued an order in 1942 calling for
the immediate execution of Allied parachutists as a matter of military
necessity.160 Thus, like many downed airmen and French resistance
fighters who met their fate, my grandfather's death might have served
as yet another example of Germany's violent occupation.
VI. THE HORRORS OF WAR AND GERMANY'S VIOLENT OCCUPATION
Lt. Murphy survived the harrowing experience of parachuting from
his stricken B-17 and subsequently evading capture. Specific details of
his declassified account, however, reveal that he was likely unprepared
for the horrific nature of land warfare.16 1 As described in the remainder
of Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, the conduct of German soldiers
was not only contrary to the law of war as it existed in the summer of
1944, it was also morally reprehensible.162
Within the first two days of his attempted escape, my grandfather
learned that survival was going to be a daily struggle. He slept in the
woods at night and nearly froze to death.163 He quickly exhausted the
meager supplies in his survival pack and had no food or water. 16 As a
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. art. 44(4).
159. GREEN, supra note 34, at 176.
160. Charlesworth, 2 SAS Regiment, supra note 13, at 12. Charlesworth writes that this
Commando Order and subsequent Supplementary Order of the Fuhrer "called for all captured
parachutists to be handed over ... for disposal." Id. at 18. Notably, both documents cite military
necessity as justification for such conduct. Id. To view a translation of this primary source
material, see HITLER'S COMMANDO ORDER (Oct. 18, 1942), available at http://www.
combinedops.com/HitlersCommandoOrder.htm.
161. See generally E&E No. 866, supra note 28.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 8.
164. Id. at 9.
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result, he had to approach sympathetic civilians for assistance.' 6 5 One of
the few facts my father and I knew about my grandfather was that the
man was a devout Catholic. Thus, it must have seemed like divine
providence when in those first few days he was directed to a Catholic
Priest for assistance.' 66
Although my grandfather spoke no French, local inhabitants likely
realized his religious preference from the engravings on his dog ta s.
They gave him a letter and pointed him toward a nearby village.I He
circled the small town at first, looking for signs of German patrols, and
then proceeded directly to the church as he had been instructed.1 69
When the Priest appeared at the door my grandfather handed him the
The Priest responded almost
note and pleaded for assistance.1
immediately with one simple phrase-"Au revoir."i 7 1 Like most of the
civilian population, this man of faith was likely frightened by the threat
of retribution.
German forces had increased patrols because they knew "Americans
were in the region." 72 In addition, la Milice Frangaisewas terrorizing
the countryside at the behest of its German occupiers. 173 With few
options, my grandfather slept on the bare earth and later concealed
himself amongst horses in local stables.' 74 He even hid in one family's
"WC," or outhouse, on June 6, 1944, the day the Normandy landings
took place.175 His daily existence was fraught with peril, and during this
time, German soldiers monitored all radio transmissions in the region.' 7 6
As a result, a number of French operatives were captured after they
signaled my grandfather's position to Allied troops. 1 One man who
narrowly escaped had "literally been beaten half to death" during the
incident. 7 8
Being taken into custody by German forces or la Milice Franqaise
meant certain death for many members of le Maquis.179 While staying at
Monsieur Gerbeau's farm, my grandfather met a "tall very good looking
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
JACKSON, supra note 29, at 544-46. See generally CHAMBARD, supra note 29.
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young captain in the French Intelligence Service, Jean, who had arrived
with a short very heavily bearded chap . . . having parachuted into

France."' 80 These men came to meet with the grand chef de resistance
and assist training operations at the farm.' 8 ' Unfortunately, both men
were captured and subsequently brutalized by German forces.' 82 Jean,
the tall good looking captain, was tortured.' 83 His companion, the
"bearded chap," was summarily murdered.1 84
Although these events are alarming, they represent only a hint of the
true horror my grandfather witnessed. German soldiers throughout
France used violence as a tool of occupation.'8 Furthermore, they were
capable of far more egregious conduct than merely murdering local
resistance fighters. While the deaths of members of le Maquis were
certainly tragic, there is one particular recollection contained in Escape
and Evasion Report No. 866 that defies all explanation.186 It can only be
described as a grotesque and appalling perversion of war.
In a handwritten note scrawled in the margin of the report, my
grandfather attests to having witnessed a shameful atrocity committed
against the French population.' 8 7 In his own voice, he painfully recalls:
About 3 weeks ago I saw a town within 4 hours bicycle ride up
the Gerbeau farm where some 500 men, women, and children had
been murdered by the Germans. I saw one baby who had been
crucified. 8 8
There is no question that the event described by Lt. Murphy signifies
a complete abandonment of the laws and customs of war. Readers of his
words, even sixty-nine years after they were first transcribed, cannot
help but succumb to the powerful and deplorable imagery they invoke.
Such conduct seemingly transcends all conscionable bounds of cruelty.
Furthermore, it suggests a gross repudiation of every principle of human
decency. While the men who committed these crimes likely justified
their behavior under the doctrine of Kriegsraison,the genuine rationale
behind their conduct may be far simpler to explain. German soldiers

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

185. MAx HASTINGS, DAS REICH: THE MARCH OF THE 2ND SS PANZER DivSION THROUGH

FRANCE (1982) (documenting the 2nd SS Panzer Division's march through France to reinforce
German soldiers battling the advancing American Army).
186. E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 5.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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were attempting to terrorize French civilians into submission. 89 in
effect, they were acting out of desperation as the War slowly slipped
from their grasp.190
Despite the shocking content of this revelation, it is initially unclear
whether the full significance of my grandfather's addendum was
recognized by military intelligence officers overseeing his debriefing.
As a practical matter, this hastily transcribed addition was not included
in the final, typed version of the report. 19 1 The officer charged with
conducting my grandfather's interview also failed to record any other
information related to this grisly remembrance.' 92 Rather, he seemed far
more concerned with discussing German tactical movements and troop
concentrations-the precise type of information that escape and evasion
reports were intended to collect. Thus, it seems possible that this
classified postscript, which was unavailable for public scrutiny, went
unnoticed by the approving official and the Army chain of command
due to its nearly indecipherable penmanship.
By the time this document was first declassified in 1974, nearly
thirty years had passed since the end of the War and four years since my
grandfather's death.193 In addition, the war crime trials at Nuremberg,
and other related war crimes proceedings, had concluded over twentyfive years prior. During this intervening period, my grandfather was
prohibited from openly discussing the particular facts of his wartime
experience because of the security certificate he signed in 1944.194
Moreover, it seems likely that he found it difficult to speak about such
hellish recollections. In subsequently contacting members of the
Murphy family, it was clear they had no knowledge of this report or the
incident described therein. As a result, it has yet to be determined
whether this long faded and nearly forgotten attestation represents
undiscovered evidence of a terrible criminal act perpetrated against the
French population.' 95
189. HASTINGS, supra note 185 (describing savage reprisals taken against civilians by the
2nd SS Panzer Division in central France).
190. Id.
191. See generallyE&E No. 866, supra note 28.
192. Id.
193. According to the National Archives and Records Administration, E&E No. 866 was
declassified under Declassification Project Number NND 745001 in 1974. E-mail from National
Archives and Records Administration, to author (June 2, 2011, 15:46 EST) (on file with author).
Thus, the report remained classified for a period of thirty years after its initial transcription and
classification. Notably, this declassified document was only recently made available to the
public in electronic format on the National Archives website.
194. E&E No. 866, supranote 28, at 21.
195.

See SARAH FARMER, MARTYRED VILLAGE (1999); JEAN-JACQUES FOUCHE, MASSACRE

AT ORADouR FRANCE, 1944: COMING To GRIPS wiTH TERROR (2005); ANDRE DESOURTEAUX,

ORADOUR/GLANE: NOTRE VILLAGE ASSASSINE (1998). Atrocities similar to that described in
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One can only imagine how this experience affected my grandfather,
a religious man forced to observe this scene of extreme malice. These
memories likely haunted him for the remainder of his life. While
German soldiers had demonstrated little regard for the law of war,
nothing could prepare an individual for the horrific image of a crucified
child. In addition, there is no feasible justification for why these
activities would have been necessary for military success. Rather, such
misconduct suggests an innate contempt for all humanitarian duties
imposed under international law.
This event demonstrates an absolute disregard for the "high ideals"
expressed in the Preamble to Hague IV. 19 Moreover, it represents
multiple violations of the Articles contained in the annexed
Regulations.197 During World War II, there was "no special provision in
the law of armed conflict concerning the treatment of the civilian
population in territory controlled by a belligerent . .. although atrocities

against the civilian population of the adverse party would amount to war
crimes."' 98 Rather, the duties inherent to bellW erent occupation were
expressed by a host of provisions in Hague IV.1
Generally, Hague IV's annexed Regulations "proscribe the rules of
conduct and the limitations imposed upon the occupant on behalf of the
inhabitants of the territory in question." 200 Article 43 dictates that "the
authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of
the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respectin& unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country."
Notably, the conduct described in Escape and Evasion
Report No. 866 seems to embody the antithesis of protecting public

order and safety. 202
E&E No. 866 occurred in a west central French village named Oradour-sur-Glane. FARMER,
supra, at 1. On June 10, 1944, a special unit of German forces indiscriminately massacred 642
men, women, and children. Id. On June 11, "all that remained of Oradour was a smoldering
mass of bumt farms, shops, and houses." Id at 24. The ruins of the town, sometimes referred to
as village martyr, were left untouched after the war as a memorial to those who were murdered.
Id. at 2. It is unclear from Lt. Murphy's account whether this is the town in question.
196. GREEN, supra note 34, at 41; Meron, supra note 56, at 79. See generally Downey,
supra note 56, at 251.
197. See generally Hague IV, supra note 55.
198.

GREEN, supra note 34, at 256.

199. See generally Hague IV, supra note 55, pmbl. & arts 22, 25, 43, 50.
200. GREEN, supra note 34, at 284. For primary source material related to the American
view of the Law of Occupation during World War II, see The Judge Advocate General's School,
The Law of Belligerent Occupation (1944) [hereinafter Law of Occupation], available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdflaw-of-belligerent-occupationI1 .pdf
201. Hague IV, supra note 55, art. 43. See also Law of Occupation, supra note 200, at 36,
38, 54, 55, 70.
202. See generally E&E No. 866, supra note 28.
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The concept of distinction, which was first articulated in Article 25,
requires that parties to a conflict distinguish at all times between
combatants and peaceful civilians.20 3 This provision effectively
precludes "the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended."2 0 4 Articles 22
and 23(e) of the annexed Regulations prohibit the infliction of
"unnecessary suffering" and "superfluous injury" during hostilities. 205
As noted "[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the
enemy is not unlimited." 206 In addition, Article 50 declares that "[n]o
general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the
population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot
be regarded as jointly and severally liable." 207 Thus, collective
punishment of the civilian population is forbidden. 208
World War II was "catastrophic for many civilian populations,
especially those in besieged and bombarded cities, and in occupied
territories." 20 9 At the end of hostilities, however, "there was broad
international acceptance of the need to adopt an international agreement
for the protection of civilians."210 As a result, GC IV was the "first
treaty devoted exclusively to the protection of civilians in time of
war." 2 11 Article 3 of GC IV reemphasizes the humanitarian principles
outlined in the Martens Clause when it requires that "[p]ersons taking
no active part in the hostilities . .. shall in all circumstances be treated

humanely." 2 12 Furthermore, Article 4 introduces the term "protected
persons" which is defined as "those who, at a given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation,
in the hands of a party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they
are not nationals." 213
203. Hague IV, supra note 55, art. 25. For a modem discussion of the concept of
distinction, see Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency,the War on Terror,and the Laws of War,
95 VA. L. REv. 1745, 1780-91 (2009); Mark Maxwell & Richard Meyer, The Principle of
Distinction:Probing the Limits of Customariness,2007 ARMY LAW. 1 (2007).
204. Hague IV, supra note 55, art. 25.
205. Id. arts. 22 & 23(e).
206. Id. art. 22.
207. Id. art. 50. See also Law of Occupation, supra note 200, at 116.
208. For a discussion of the evolution of civilian immunity under Hague IV, see Richard
Rosen, TargetingEnemy Forces in the War on Terror:Preserving Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 683, 699-702 (2009).
209. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 300.

210. Id.
211. Id. at 299.
212. Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
art. 4 (1949) [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. See also SOLIS, supra note 67, at 234-37;
Michael Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion ofDirect Participationin Hostilities,
1 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 5, 28, 39 (2010).
213. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 212, art. 4.
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In contemporary conflicts, GC IV requires that certain common
protections be applied to protected persons, in particular women and
children.214 For example, "[p]rotected persons are entitled, in all
circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family
rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and
customs . . . [t]hey shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be

protected especially against all acts of violence."2 5 Article 32 of GC IV
also forbids "physical suffering or extermination of protected persons
... [t]his prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal
punishment, mutilation ... but also to any other measures of brutality
whether applied by civilian or military agents." 216
In addition, GC IV's provisions have been heavily supplemented by
AP I which deals with the protection of civilian persons during times of
war. 3117 Notably, Article 35 of AP I reiterates Hague IV's prohibition on
superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.21 Moreover, Article 51
states that the "civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy
general protection against dangers arising from military operations ...
[t]hey shall not be the object of attack."219 Thus, "[a]cts or threats of
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
civilian population" are expressly prohibited.2 20
As such, there is little question that the event described in Escape
and Evasion Report No. 866 constitutes a gross violation of both the
historical and contemporary laws of war. In addition, this incident
signifies a repudiation of the humanitarian principles outlined in the
Preamble to Hague IV and in relevant customary international law.
Despite Germany's reliance on the doctrine of Kriegsraison, there was
no general exception to applicable treaty provisions which allowed for
indiscriminate attacks and infliction of unnecessary suffering based
upon military necessity. 22 1 Rather, the event described by my
grandfather should have been characterized as an egregious war crime
and punished accordingly.

214. Id. art. 27. See also SOLIS, supra note 67, at 311.
215. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 212, art. 27.
216. Id. art. 32.
217. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 300. See also SOLIS, supra note 67, at 121-25.
218. AP I, supra note 116, art. 35.
219. Id. art. 51. See also Mark Maxwell, The Law of War and Civilians on the Battlefield:
Are We Undennining Civilian Protections?, MIL. L. REV. 18 (Sept-Oct. 2004) (citing
International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 615).
220. AP I, supra note 116, art. 35.
221. Charlesworth, Forgotten Justice, supra note 18, at 10 (theorizing that Nazi law itself
"constituted a 'state of exception,' thereby conferring a separate cocoon-like status upon law in
Nazi Germany").
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VII. CONCLUSION
The study of declassified intelligence has the potential to reshape
modern conceptions of history. In particular, World War II era records
provide valuable insight into "aspects of German behavior, and thus of
Western European culture in the first half of the twentieth century." 222
As German forces swept across Europe, Nazi leaders worried "that
'weaker' contemporaries and subsequent generations might not
understand the 'necessity' of their actions." 223 Thus, they attempted to
conceal not only the corpses of their victims but also the homicidal
policies underlying their wartime indiscretions. 224 At the conclusion of
this great conflict, thousands of war criminals escaped prosecution due
in part to an "intelligence failure" by Allied forces. 22 5 Scholars
acknowledge that "this failure had less to do with collecting information
than with recognizing its significance." 226
Socio-legal methods have a tendenc to reveal alternative viewpoints
or reconstructions of historical events. As Salter notes, "[n]o single
and supposedly self-sufficient academic discipline can ever be adequate
to any research topic." 228 Thus, proponents of this interdisciplinary
approach understand that "history is a work in progress." 22 They
appreciate that by elevating the experience of the individual above the
collective, researchers are able to challenge the assumptions of
traditional historians. When ordinary soldiers "include personal
comments in their correspondence, or write in pencil on the margins of
reports . . . [t]hey are not writing diaries for posterity." 230 Rather, these
historical witnesses are "writing in the moment to satisfy military
requirements."231 As a result, their words should be afforded additional
deference by virtue of their having experienced these events
222. Id. at 9.
223.

BREITMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 3.

224. Id. See also Charlesworth, Forgotten Justice, supra note 18, at 10 (explaining that
Nazi rule sanctioned gross misconduct "all the while ensuring that it was publicly
unmentionable ... The taboo was not the doing but the talking about what was done").
225. BREITMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 6. See also Charlesworth, 2 SAS Regiment, supra
note 13, at 21. While Breitman notes the partial intelligence failure of Allied forces,
Charlesworth adds that this situation was complicated by the size of the displaced population in
postwar Europe. She writes, "It has been estimated that seven million German soldiers had
surrendered in the west, one and a half million German civilians had fled from the Red Army
into the other occupied zones, some eight million foreign workers were displaced and ten
million German urban residents had fled to the countryside." Id.
226. BREITMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.

227. Charlesworth, ForgottonJustice,supra note 18, at 3.
228.

SALTER, supra note 14, at 3.

229. Charlesworth, ForgottenJustice, supra note 18, at 4.
230. Id. at 7.
231. Id.
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firsthand.2 3 2
Unfortunately, modem war crimes scholarship is often dominated by
"pessimism, disapproval, and critique." 233 This environment of
negativity has led some to reject the study of declassified intelligence,
and by implication socio-legal analysis, as a "naive search for
heroes." 234 Such academic detachment ignores "the possibility of
alternative histories ...

[as well as] a broader understanding and

recognition of the personal roles of individuals." 235 Moreover, it
marginalizes the voices of victims whose stories have yet to be told.23 6
Most scholars fail to understand that only by questioning established
orthodoxy can we truly "expose and destabilize claims to the authority
of objectivity." 237 Thus, "our best hope of completing this complex
mosaic . . . are aggressive and inquisitive historians who believe that

there are no real secrets." 238
Although critics of this Article will contend that numerous treatises
have dealt with German atrocities committed during the War, there is
one important distinction that must be made. As with any historical
research, it is often difficult to shift from a theoretical analysis of events
to a precise study of "temporal and geographic locations." 239 Thus, I
went to great lengths to determine the accuracy of the information
contained in my grandfather's report. In October 2011, I traveled to the
Cher region of France. More importantly, I was accompanied by a
remarkable historical witness, Tech Sergeant Clement Dowler, the
eighty-seven year old ball turret gunner from my grandfather's fateful
flight.2 40
Mr. Dowler and I saw many memorable things as we retraced my
grandfather's journey south through the French cities of Avord,
Bourges, Sancoins, and Sagonne. Thanks to the generosity of the French
Air Force, we gazed out upon the old runway of the Avord Airbase
where Mr. Dowler fractured his leg during a rough parachute landing on
the afternoon of April 28, 1944. We also visited with the wonderful
townspeople of the region who sheltered my grandfather and still
referred to him as the "giantamiricain"due to his surprising height. 24 1
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 4.

238. ALDRICH, supra note 9, at 16.

239. Id. at 2.
240. See generally Escape and Evasion Report No. 1669, Evasion in France,Sept. 7, 1944,
availableat http://media.nara.gov/nw/305270/EE-1 669.pdf.
241. See LAURENT BOUDIER, LURCY-LEVIs: D'HIER ET D'AuJouRD'HUi 169 (1965)
(explaining the general history of the region and providing specific description of Lt. Murphy's
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In addition, historians associated with le Musde de la Risistance in
Bourges introduced us to extraordinary men who served with le Maquis
during this tumultuous period in French history. 24 2
Of particular note, not one of the individuals present-scholar,
resistance fighter, or Mr. Dowler himself-could state with certainty
where the dreadful event described by my grandfather occurred. In
subsequent correspondence, a historian in the region, Frederic Henoff,
described the difficulties he encountered during his search for related
information:
Regarding your grandfather's [Escape and Evasion Report], I had
also read this handwritten note. When he was hidden at Mr.
Gerbeau farm [sic], at the time of the Normandy landing, a city
not far from there -

Saint-Amand-Montrond -

was for a short

time a place of fights between the French underground and the
Germans ... But we don't know [the whole] story, and perhaps
your grandfather saw things which were forgotten then in the
storm of the following fights, at the time of the liberation of the
area.
The scale of the carnage described in Escape and Evasion Report
No. 866 strongly suggests that my grandfather bore witness to the
aftermath of the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane. 24 3 This infamous mass
murder represents one of the most disgraceful wartime atrocities
committed by German forces in occupied France. Moreover, he may
have been recalling the fighting that took place in Saint-AmandMontrond, or events that transpired in another nearby village, as Mr.
Henoff maintains. It is clear that Lt. Murphy traveled through this
region, and he likely overestimated the number of victims he observed.
Nonetheless, there is one other alternative that has significant historical
and moral implications. No matter how improbable it may seem, this
declassified intelligence report could contain evidence of an
undocumented German war crime.
Criminal acts were witnessed by many, including Mr. Dowler,
involvement with resistance efforts during the war).
242. See Natalee Seely, Dowler Thanks Frenchfor Saving Him: Evaded German Capture
During World War II, PARKERSBURG NEWS & SENTINEL (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://
www.newsandsentinel.com/page/content.detaillid/554025.html (providing more information on
Mr. Dowler's recent visit to France).
243. For additional discussion of the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane, see generally
FARMER, supra note 195. Notably, the village of Oradour is within a four hour bicycle ride of
the Cher department. In addition, this is the general area where my grandfather and Tech
Sergeant Clement Dowler independently participated in resistance activities from the period
May through August 1944. Interview with Clement Dowler, former Tech Sergeant, in Avord,
France (Oct. 12, 2011).
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during his five month escape from German occupied France. Despite
this fact, the victims described in my grandfather's report are no less
deserving of justice than the millions of innocents who suffered during
this brutal conflict. At the conclusion of hostilities in World War II, it
was widely acknowledged that the "Germans had ill-treated and in
many cases executed Allied personnel belonging to both regular and
resistance forces, as well as civilians ... in occupied territories." 244 As a
result of Germany's disregard for the tenets of humanitarian law, the
Nuremberg Tribunal was established pursuant to the London Charter of
1945 for the purpose of securing "just and prompt trial and punishment
of the major war criminals of the European Axis." 245
The London Charter was notable in that it first provided a clear
definition of what constituted a war crime for the purpose of the ensuing
246
The principles established in the Charter and in the
proceedings.
Nuremberg Tribunal's resultin udgment would come to be regarded as
declaratory of the law of war. The term "war crime" was given broad
application in the proceedings and included conduct that evidenced
"violations of the laws and customs of war." 248 In addition, the Charter
introduced a new subset of war crimes described as crimes against
humanity. 249 This designation included such transgressions as "murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population."250
Interestingly, the Nuremberg Tribunal gave little credence to the use
of military necessity as a defense to German war crimes. 251 Many felt
that by distorting this concept, German soldiers reduced "the entire
body of the laws of war to a code of military convenience, having no
further sanction than the sense of honour [sic] of the individual military
commander." 2 52 Thus, within the guidelines set forth by the Nuremberg
244. GREEN, supra note 34, at 320.
245. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 280 [hereinafter London Charter]. For primary source material related to the judgment
at Nuremberg, see Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg
War Crimes Trials (Aug. 15, 1949), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/
NTfinal-report.pdf.
246. Taylor, supra note 245, at 324. See also Theodor Meron, Reflections on the
Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 551, 562 (2006).
247. GREEN, supra note 34, at 320.
248. London Charter, supra note 245, art. 6 (emphasis added).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, The Charter and Judgment of the Numberg
Trial - History and Analysis, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
documentation/english/a cn4_5.pdf. See also Jochnick & Normand, supra note 49, at 64;
Schmitt, supra note 49; Downey, supra note 56.
252. GREEN, supra note 34, at 148. See also Horton, supra note 67, at 585-87; SOLIs, supra
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Tribunal, my grandfather's account unequivocally demonstrates that
Kriegsraisonis both morally reprehensible and criminal. In effect, this
doctrine allows a belligerent to justify even the most abhorrent behavior
under the guise of military necessity. Consequently, it serves as nothing
more than a means of enabling wartime misconduct.
While the Nuremberg Tribunal is now a fixture of the past, the
majority of German war criminals were tried by national courts.2 5 3 This
trend continues to the present day.254 One only has to look to the May
2011 conviction of a former guard at a Nazi concentration camp to see
the utility of this forum for prosecuting war crimes which occurred
many years ago. 255 Although my initial intent in writing this Article was
to pay tribute to Lt. Murphy's bravery and sacrifice, my thoughts often
turned to the innocent French civilians whose lives were extinguished in
the summer of 1944. I pondered whether the perpetrators of this vicious
crime were punished and whether the true extent of their acts had been
exposed to the world.
As a result, my final conclusion related to Escape and Evasion
Report No. 866 is that the facts outlined in this document simply
demand further scrutiny. In essence, this Article is a humble appeal for
renewed investigation of this historical evidence. National courts still
provide a feasible venue for determining culpability should my
grandfather's report lead to evidence that is more substantial in nature.
Furthermore, the Nuremberg Tribunal did not place a statute of
limitations on war crimes or crimes against humanity, nor should the

French government. 25 6
Thus, even though my grandfather passed away over forty years ago,
note 67, at 266.
253. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 11; Charlesworth, ForgottonJustice,supra note
18. See also Meron, supra note 246, at 557; M. Cherif Bassiouni, "The War to End all Wars"
and the Birth of a HandicappedInternational CriminalJustice System, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 244, 253 (2002).
254. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 50, at 11.

255. See generally Jack Ewing & Alan Cowell, Demjanjuk Convicted for Role in Nazi
Death Camp, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/world/europe/13
nazi.html. On May 12, 2011, John Demjanjuk was found guilty by a German court of taking part
in the murder of 28,000 people in 1943. Id. He served as a guard at the Sobibor concentration
camp in German occupied Poland during World War II. Id. After decades of legal proceedings,
Demjanjuk's conviction was hailed by many as evidence of the immutability of justice. Id.
256. The applicability of statutes of limitation to war crimes and crimes against humanity
has been an area of debate in France. National law and subsequent decisions by the Court of
Cassation seemingly indicate that war crimes prosecutions are constrained by a statute of
limitations. See Barbie Case (1985). Nonetheless, France unequivocally supported nonapplicability during debate in front of the U.N. General Assembly. See Statement Before the
U.N. General Assembly (1967). In addition, they signed the European Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes. See
Signatories to the Convention (1968).
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his story could finally bring justice for the men, women, and children
who suffered unlawful deaths at the hands of their German occupiers.
Although I never had the pleasure of meeting Lt. Murphy, I strongly
suspect that he, and the honorable men that fought alongside him, would
have wanted it that way.
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